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Suggestions to Reconsider Under TRAP 79.2(d): How the CCA Reopens Habeas Denials, and Why the Presiding Judge Wants a Rule

Category: Habeas Applications
Date: September 18, 2026
Author: Brett Ordiway

When the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denies a habeas application, the practitioner’s first instinct is to look for a way back in. In other contexts, the Rules of Appellate Procedure provide a formal path for a motion for rehearing, but under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 79.2(d), that path is expressly foreclosed for habeas applications: “A motion for rehearing an order that denied habeas corpus relief or dismissed a habeas corpus application under Code of Criminal Procedure, articles 11.07 or 11.071, may not be filed.” What Rule 79.2(d) allows instead — in the same subsection, in the very next sentence — is something different: “The Court may on its own initiative reconsider the case.”

That single sentence is the entire textual basis for what has become one of the most-used and least-understood filings in Texas post-conviction practice: the “suggestion to reconsider on the Court’s own initiative.” Practitioners file them. The Court sometimes grants them. There is no rule that describes how to write one, when to file one, what standard the Court applies, or what a party must show to succeed. In a recent concurring opinion, the CCA’s presiding judge has publicly suggested that this is a problem the Court should fix.

This post explains what a suggestion to reconsider is, how the informal practice works, what the Court’s own-initiative reconsideration power actually does, and what Presiding Judge Schenck’s concurrence in Ex parte Hicks proposes.

The Statutory and Rule Framework

Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure is the habeas procedure for challenging final felony convictions where the applicant is no longer on community supervision. Article 11.071 is the procedure for capital cases. Both are structured to run through the trial court that entered the conviction, which develops findings of fact and conclusions of law, with the Court of Criminal Appeals as the final authority. When the CCA denies relief, the ordinary path to appellate reconsideration — a motion for rehearing under TRAP 79.1 — is expressly unavailable.

What remains is the Court’s inherent authority to reconsider its own orders on its own initiative. The Court has long recognized that authority. In Ex parte Moreno, 245 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008), the Court held that Article 11.071 contains no language prohibiting reconsideration of an initial disposition on the Court’s own motion and no temporal limitation on when such reconsideration may occur. The reasoning applies with equal force to Article 11.07 applications concerning non-capital final felony convictions.

Moreno also announced the standard the Court has applied ever since: reconsideration is an “unusual” measure, to be undertaken only under “the most extraordinary of circumstances,” and the State’s legitimate interest in finality will ordinarily prevail even in the face of a reasonable argument that the original disposition was incorrect. Every subsequent decision granting reconsideration cites Moreno as the governing standard.

Rule 79.2(d), then, does two things at once. It closes the door on party-initiated rehearing motions. And it preserves the Court’s own-initiative reconsideration power. The suggestion to reconsider lives in the space between those two provisions: a filing by which a party asks the Court to exercise a power the Court has, but that the rules do not describe.

What a Suggestion to Reconsider Actually Is

Because there is no rule that governs the filing, there is no rule that names it. Practitioners call it different things — a suggestion to reconsider, a suggestion to reconsider on the Court’s own initiative, a motion to reopen, a motion to revive and reinstate, a motion for reconsideration on the Court’s own motion. All refer to the same underlying request: an ask that the Court exercise its Rule 79.2(d) authority to revisit a denial.

The filings share a few features in practice, even without a rule. They are typically directed at a specific factual or legal development that post-dates the denial. They usually identify the specific finding, conclusion, or ruling the applicant contends was mistaken. They frame the request as a matter for the Court’s discretion rather than the party’s right. And they typically attach whatever new evidence, documentation, or legal authority supports the request.

Notably, in every reported case in which the Court has granted reconsideration under Rule 79.2(d), the reconsideration was preceded by a filing from the applicant — even though the Court’s action is consistently characterized as taken “on our own initiative.” The rule prohibits a formal motion for rehearing, so the applicant’s filing is treated as a suggestion. But as a practical matter, the Court reconsiders when a party asks it to.

Beyond those common features, the filings vary widely — in length, in structure, in tone, and in the standards they invoke. Presiding Judge Schenck’s concurrence in Ex parte Hicks accurately describes the current landscape: filings styled in “all kinds of ways” containing a “cacophony of allegations in no particular order or format,” some of which the Court has had to construe as suggestions to reconsider even when the filing did not use that label.

When Suggestions to Reconsider Succeed

The Court’s own case law offers the clearest picture of when a suggestion to reconsider actually works, because there is no rule to consult. Grants are rare — in the roughly two decades since Rule 79.2(d) took its current form, only about a dozen decisions have granted reconsideration on the merits. Those decisions cluster into a small number of substantive categories.

Intervening Supreme Court Authority — The Dominant Category

By a wide margin, the most common basis for reconsideration is an intervening change in controlling Supreme Court authority that renders the original disposition objectively unreasonable or clearly incorrect under the new precedent. Seven of the roughly eleven successful reconsiderations fall into this category, and they cluster tightly around two Supreme Court decisions.

The first cluster arises from the Penry v. Johnson line and its progeny — Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman and Brewer v. Quarterman — on the constitutional adequacy of Texas’s mitigation instructions in death-penalty cases. Ex parte Moreno itself is the paradigmatic example: the Court granted reconsideration on the day of the applicant’s scheduled execution in light of Abdul-Kabir and Brewer, concluding that its earlier denial was “objectively unreasonable” under then-extant Supreme Court precedent, and ultimately vacated the death sentence for a new punishment hearing. Ex parte Davis, No. AP-76,263, 2009 WL 3839065 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 18, 2009), followed the same path on nullification-instruction grounds, also resulting in a remand for a new punishment hearing.

The second and larger cluster arises from Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (2017), which rejected the Briseno factors previously used by Texas courts to analyze adaptive deficits in intellectual-disability determinations under Atkins v. Virginia. In 2018 alone, the Court granted reconsideration in four Moore-triggered capital cases: Ex parte Lizcano, No. WR-68,348-03, 2018 WL 2717035 (Tex. Crim. App. June 6, 2018); Ex parte Cathey, No. WR-55,161-02, 2018 WL 5817199 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 7, 2018); Ex parte Henderson, No. WR-37,658-03, 2018 WL 4762755 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 3, 2018); and Ex parte Wood, 568 S.W.3d 678 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). Three resulted in remand to the habeas court for new findings; Wood resulted in denial on the merits after reconsideration.

Ex parte Robertson, 603 S.W.3d 427 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020), extended the intervening-authority category beyond the Penry and Atkins contexts. The Court reopened a 1998 capital denial to reconsider a Batson claim in light of Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017), and Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017), and remanded for new fact-finding on the racial-discrimination-in-jury-selection issue.

Two features of the Moore cluster are worth flagging for practitioners. First, each of these cases was preceded by a federal habeas proceeding that the federal court had stayed to allow the Texas courts to address the new Supreme Court authority. The federal stay is, in practice, a common precipitating event for the state suggestion. Second, in both Cathey and Henderson, the CCA had previously declined suggestions to reconsider the same denials before Moore was decided — meaning the same applicant filed a suggestion, was denied, and then filed again years later when the legal landscape changed. That pattern is a useful reminder that a denial of a suggestion is not necessarily the end of the road when a subsequent development materially changes the analysis.

Newly Discovered Evidence Bearing on Credibility

The second substantive category involves newly discovered evidence that directly contradicts a sworn declaration or documentary submission on which the trial court’s findings rested. Ex parte Barrow, No. WR-54,074-01, 2009 WL 4932329 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 16, 2009), remains the paradigmatic non-capital example. The Court denied Barrow’s habeas application in 2003. Six years later, it withdrew that denial under Rule 79.2(d) because the applicant had presented newly discovered evidence bearing on the credibility of the State’s key witness — undercover narcotics agent Tom Coleman — and because trial counsel’s affidavit in the state habeas proceedings conflicted with the newly submitted evidence. The Court remanded for findings on Brady, ineffective-assistance, and actual-innocence claims.

Barrow is the paradigmatic case, but it is also the only non-capital reconsideration in the reported decisions that turned on newly discovered credibility evidence. That relative scarcity is worth acknowledging: the credibility-evidence category is real, and Barrow is a real success, but it is not a large body of case law.

Intervening Change in State-Court Doctrine

A third category, closely related to the first but distinct, involves changes in the CCA’s own controlling doctrine that make the original disposition incorrect under the state court’s own evolved framework. Ex parte Moussazadeh, 361 S.W.3d 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012), is the leading example. The Court had denied Moussazadeh’s initial application in 2001, holding that a plea attorney’s parole-eligibility misinformation did not render the plea involuntary unless the misinformation was an essential element of the plea agreement. In 2012, on the applicant’s suggestion, the Court reconsidered — expressly disavowing its earlier decisions in Ex parte Evans and Moussazadeh II — and granted relief. Moussazadeh is the only non-capital case in which the Court has granted merits relief on reconsideration in the modern era of Rule 79.2(d).

Procedural or Clerical Error by the Court Itself

Finally, the Court has occasionally reconsidered its own denials or dismissals when the original disposition rested on a procedural or clerical error attributable to the Court. Ex parte Reynoso, 257 S.W.3d 715 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008), is the leading published example: the Court reconsidered a dismissal-as-untimely after concluding it had not properly applied TRAP 4.1(a)’s time-computation provision to the Article 11.071 § 4(b) filing deadline, ultimately accepting the application as timely before denying relief on the merits. Ex parte Duran, No. WR-76,866-02, 2019 WL 137766 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 9, 2019), is the unpublished non-capital counterpart: the Court dismissed an Article 11.07 application for non-compliance with the Rules of Appellate Procedure, then acknowledged on the applicant’s motion that “the Court dismissed Applicant’s 11.07 writ application in error” and reopened the case. Reconsideration in this category is essentially error-correction rather than reevaluation on the merits.

The Pattern in Broad Strokes

Taken together, the case law shows that Rule 79.2(d) reconsideration is overwhelmingly a tool of capital post-conviction practice — nine of the eleven substantive grants have involved Article 11.071 applications — and overwhelmingly driven by intervening Supreme Court authority rather than by newly discovered evidence or other case-specific developments. In the non-capital context, reconsideration is available but genuinely rare, with Barrow and Moussazadeh accounting for the entirety of the modern substantive record.

What Suggestions to Reconsider Cannot Do

The suggestion to reconsider is not a substitute for the motion for rehearing that Rule 79.2(d) forecloses. A filing that simply relitigates the merits of the underlying application, without identifying a genuine post-denial development, is unlikely to succeed regardless of how it is styled.

Nor is the suggestion a substitute for a subsequent application under Article 11.07 § 4. Where the applicant has a genuinely new claim — one that could not have been raised in the initial application because of the § 4 exceptions for previously unavailable factual or legal bases, or actual innocence — the appropriate vehicle is a subsequent application, not a suggestion to reconsider the denial of the first application. The two procedures overlap around the edges but they are meaningfully different, and choosing the wrong one can foreclose the right one.

The Court’s Rule 79.2(d) reconsideration power has not been used, in the reported cases, as a mechanism for reviving claims that were procedurally defaulted in the initial application. Where a claim was available in the initial application and was not raised, the fact that new evidence about the claim later surfaces has not, in any reported decision, converted a defaulted claim into a live one.

Presiding Judge Schenck’s Recent Concurrences: A Coherent View of the Doctrine

In 2026, Presiding Judge Schenck wrote two concurring opinions that, taken together, articulate a coherent view of what suggestions to reconsider are and what they are not. Read together, they are a useful window into how the presiding judge — and, likely, the Court he leads — is thinking about the doctrine.

Ex parte Hicks (September 17, 2026): The Rulemaking Problem

In Ex parte Hicks, No. WR-96,896-01, the applicant filed a second suggestion to reconsider based on Presiding Judge Schenck’s own concurring opinion in a prior case, Ex parte Martinez. The presiding judge concurred in the Court’s denial of the Hicks suggestion — a concurring opinion, he explained, does not carry the day and is not a binding new legal basis. But he wrote separately to raise a broader concern about the procedure itself.

His observations, in short:

  • The rules provide no mechanism by which a party can ask the Court to reopen a writ application, despite the fact that the Court can reconsider one at any time
  • The absence of a rule has produced an “ad hoc motion practice that not everyone knows about”
  • Filings arrive styled in inconsistent ways with allegations in no particular order or format
  • Practitioners who do not follow every CCA handdown may never learn that this filing option exists
  • The Court, as the highest criminal court in Texas and the body responsible for promulgating rules that promote fairness and uniformity of appellate procedures, “can do better than this”

His proposal is that the Court amend the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure to provide a formal procedure for these motions. He suggests the rule might require a motion for leave to file and good cause for filing, and it would ensure uniformity by setting guidelines for parties to follow.

Ex parte Guzman (May 21, 2026): The Scope Problem

Four months before Hicks, Presiding Judge Schenck wrote a concurrence in Ex parte Guzman, No. WR-75,864-05, 2026 WL 1431118 (Tex. Crim. App. May 21, 2026), that addressed a different aspect of the same practice. The applicant in Guzman had filed a second suggestion asking the Court to reconsider his 2022 writ application in light of Ex parte Roark, 707 S.W.3d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024), and Ex parte Roberson, 726 S.W.3d 290 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025), because his conviction rested on a shaken-baby-syndrome theory that had been reexamined in those decisions.

The Court denied reconsideration, and the presiding judge concurred to explain why. His point was substantive rather than procedural: “an invitation for the Court to reconsider, on its own motion, reopening a writ is not a proper mechanism for a claimant to press claims of entitlement to relief based on subsequent development of the legal landscape. Such claims are proper if and to the extent they fall within the rules permitting renewed resort to the writ” — that is, under Article 11.07 § 4.

Judge Finley concurred separately in Guzman and made a related but more applicant-favorable point: the applicant’s claims sounded like an Article 11.073 application (the specific mechanism for challenging convictions based on subsequently discredited scientific evidence), and Roark likely counts as “new law” for purposes of the subsequent-writ bar in § 4(a)(1). The Court’s denial of the suggestion, on Judge Finley’s view, was correct but should not be read as foreclosing an 11.073 application on the same underlying claim.

What the Two Opinions, Together, Say

Read alongside one another, Hicks and Guzman describe a doctrine narrower than what the Court has historically applied. Hicks argues the current suggestion-to-reconsider practice needs formal rulemaking. Guzman argues that even within the current practice, claims based on legal developments post-dating the denial belong in a subsequent application under § 4, not in a suggestion under Rule 79.2(d).

That second position sits uneasily with the Court’s own record. Every one of the Moore v. Texas reconsiderations granted in 2018 — Lizcano, Cathey, Henderson, and Wood — was triggered by exactly the kind of post-denial change in Supreme Court authority that Guzman says does not belong in a suggestion. Ex parte Robertson (2020) is the same: the Court reopened a 1998 denial on the basis of Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado and Buck v. Davis, both decided long after the original disposition. And Ex parte Moreno itself — the case that established the Court’s temporal-authority reasoning for Rule 79.2(d) — was granted on the basis of Abdul-Kabir and Brewer, Supreme Court decisions that post-dated the original 2000 denial by seven years.

The honest description is that the Court used to grant reconsideration for exactly this kind of intervening-authority claim, and newer judges are signaling that they see the doctrine differently. The composition of the Court of Criminal Appeals has changed meaningfully in recent years, and Hicks and Guzman are the clearest public indication that at least one member of the current Court — the presiding judge — reads Rule 79.2(d) more narrowly than the Court read it in the Moreno and Moore v. Texas eras. What the two Schenck opinions together may be signaling is a preference to migrate certain claim categories out of Rule 79.2(d) and into § 4 or Article 11.073, both of which have statutory text that governs them and threshold requirements that constrain them. Whether the rest of the Court agrees is a question the case law has not yet answered.

For practitioners, the honest reading is that the doctrine is in flux. A suggestion premised on intervening authority still works on the historical record — the Court has granted plenty of them. But where a subsequent application under § 4 or § 11.073 is genuinely available, the strategic case for filing it alongside — or instead of — a suggestion has become stronger, not weaker.

Presiding Judge Schenck writes for himself, and neither Hicks nor Guzman is designated for publication. But the two opinions represent the most substantive judicial engagement with Rule 79.2(d) since Moreno, and where a presiding judge is signaling a preferred direction, that signal warrants attention even without a majority opinion behind it.

What This Means for Practitioners and Applicants

Until the Court adopts a rule, suggestions to reconsider will continue to exist in their current form: available, effective in the right cases, and undocumented in any rule. A few practical observations, informed by the pattern of successful cases.

The realistic path to reconsideration, historically, has run through intervening authority — but newer judges are signaling a narrower view. The single most reliable trigger, by a wide margin in the case law, has been a post-denial change in controlling Supreme Court or CCA authority that materially undermines the original disposition. That is descriptively true of the record. Presiding Judge Schenck’s Guzman concurrence, however, would channel those claims into § 4 subsequent applications instead — a narrower reading of Rule 79.2(d) than the earlier Court applied. Practitioners identifying potential reconsideration candidates should be asking two questions: first, has the legal landscape shifted since the original denial in a way the Court cannot ignore, and second, is there a subsequent-application vehicle that would fit the same claim? Where both answers are yes, filing both — or at least seriously considering it — is now the more defensible approach.

Timing matters, even without a formal deadline. Rule 79.2(d) does not impose a filing deadline on suggestions to reconsider, and the Moreno line of cases confirms that the Court’s own-initiative reconsideration power is not temporally limited. In practice, however, suggestions filed promptly after the development that gives rise to the request — a new Supreme Court decision, a new documentary discovery, a federal habeas stay — are more effective than those filed after long delay. The Court’s willingness to reconsider is greatest when the reason for reconsideration is fresh.

Framing matters. The most effective suggestions identify with precision what the Court is being asked to reconsider — a specific finding, a specific ruling, a specific conclusion — and explain with equal precision why the post-denial development undermines it. Generic requests for reconsideration are almost never granted. Targeted requests, tied to concrete evidence or authority, sometimes are.

Evidence matters. Where the suggestion turns on newly discovered evidence, the evidence needs to be genuinely new — not merely newly presented — and it needs to be documented with the same care an initial habeas application would require. Contemporaneous documents, corroborating affidavits, and expert evaluations where appropriate are what move the Court from procedural denial to actual reconsideration.

Client counsel matters. Because the suggestion to reconsider is a discretionary filing with no formal standards and no guaranteed review, honest client counsel is essential. The Moreno standard — “the most extraordinary of circumstances,” with the State’s finality interest ordinarily prevailing — is the honest starting point for any client conversation. Practitioners should not represent to clients that a suggestion is functionally the same as an appeal or a rehearing motion. It is a request the Court may grant or deny, in its discretion, without opinion or explanation.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is a suggestion to reconsider under TRAP 79.2(d)?

A suggestion to reconsider is a filing by which a party asks the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to exercise its authority under Rule 79.2(d) to reconsider a habeas denial on the Court’s own initiative. The rule expressly forecloses motions for rehearing on habeas denials but preserves the Court’s own-initiative reconsideration power. The suggestion is the practitioner’s mechanism for asking the Court to exercise that power. There is no formal rule governing how a suggestion to reconsider must be styled, when it must be filed, or what standard applies.

Can I file a motion for rehearing after the CCA denies my habeas application?

No. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 79.2(d) provides that a motion for rehearing an order denying habeas relief or dismissing a habeas application under Articles 11.07 or 11.071 may not be filed. What Rule 79.2(d) allows instead is for the Court to reconsider on its own initiative — a power practitioners invoke through a suggestion to reconsider.

Is there a deadline to file a suggestion to reconsider?

There is no statutory or rule-based deadline. In Ex parte Moreno, 245 S.W.3d 419 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008), the Court held that its own-initiative reconsideration power is not subject to temporal limitations. As a practical matter, however, suggestions filed promptly after the post-denial development that gives rise to the request are more effective than those filed after significant delay.

What is the standard the Court applies to a suggestion to reconsider?

Under Ex parte Moreno, reconsideration under Rule 79.2(d) is an “unusual” measure to be undertaken only under “the most extraordinary of circumstances,” and the State’s legitimate interest in finality will ordinarily prevail even in the face of a reasonable argument that the original disposition was incorrect. Every subsequent decision granting reconsideration cites Moreno as the governing standard.

How often does the CCA actually grant reconsideration?

Rarely. In the roughly two decades since Rule 79.2(d) took its current form, only about a dozen decisions have granted reconsideration on the merits. Nine of those have been capital (Art. 11.071) applications; only two — Ex parte Barrow (2009) and Ex parte Moussazadeh (2012) — have been substantive non-capital grants. Most successful reconsiderations have been triggered by intervening Supreme Court authority.

What is the difference between a suggestion to reconsider and a subsequent habeas application?

A suggestion to reconsider asks the Court to revisit its prior denial of the initial habeas application. A subsequent application under Article 11.07 § 4 is a new habeas application filed after a prior application has been decided, subject to the demanding § 4 threshold requirements — the current claims and issues must not have been and could not have been presented previously because the factual or legal basis was unavailable, or because the applicant establishes actual innocence. The two procedures overlap in some circumstances but are meaningfully different, and choosing the wrong vehicle can foreclose the right one.

What kinds of developments have supported successful suggestions in reported cases?

Most successful reconsiderations fall into three categories. First and largest: intervening controlling authority from the U.S. Supreme Court that renders the original disposition objectively unreasonable — the Penry/Abdul-Kabir line (producing Ex parte Moreno and Ex parte Davis), Moore v. Texas (producing four capital reconsiderations in 2018 alone), and Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado / Buck v. Davis (Ex parte Robertson). Second: intervening change in the CCA’s own controlling doctrine (Ex parte Moussazadeh). Third: newly discovered evidence bearing on witness credibility (Ex parte Barrow). Procedural or clerical error by the Court itself is a separate, error-correction category (Ex parte Reynoso, Ex parte Duran).

What has Presiding Judge Schenck said about suggestions to reconsider?

Presiding Judge Schenck has written two 2026 concurring opinions on Rule 79.2(d) practice. In Ex parte Guzman, No. WR-75,864-05, 2026 WL 1431118 (Tex. Crim. App. May 21, 2026), he explained that a suggestion to reconsider “is not a proper mechanism for a claimant to press claims of entitlement to relief based on subsequent development of the legal landscape” — those claims belong in a subsequent application under Article 11.07 § 4. In Ex parte Hicks, No. WR-96,896-01 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 2026), he separately proposed that the Court amend the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure to create a formal procedure for these motions, including a possible leave-to-file requirement and a good-cause standard. Read together, the two concurrences signal that the presiding judge sees the current practice as both procedurally under-structured and substantively over-used.

Can I use a suggestion to reconsider to raise a new legal argument that developed after my denial?

The Court used to. Most of the successful reconsideration grants in the case law were triggered by post-denial changes in controlling Supreme Court authority — the Moore v. Texas cluster of 2018 cases, Ex parte Robertson (2020), and Ex parte Moreno (2008) itself. On that historical record, suggestions premised on intervening authority work. But newer members of the Court are signaling a different view. In Ex parte Guzman (2026), Presiding Judge Schenck wrote that this is not what suggestions are for — claims of entitlement to relief based on subsequent legal developments belong in a subsequent application under Article 11.07 § 4, not in a suggestion under Rule 79.2(d). Where the applicable claim rests on subsequently discredited scientific evidence, an Article 11.073 application may be the appropriate route instead. Whether the rest of the Court follows the presiding judge’s narrower view is a question the case law has not yet answered. In cases where a § 4 or § 11.073 application is also available, filing both — or filing the subsequent application instead of the suggestion — has become a more defensible strategy than it would have been three years ago.

Does the Hicks concurrence change what practitioners should do now?

Not immediately. The concurrence is a single-judge opinion, not designated for publication, and does not change the current practice. Suggestions to reconsider continue to be filed under Rule 79.2(d) in their current form. What the concurrence does signal is that the current unstructured practice is on the presiding judge’s radar as a rulemaking priority, and any future rule change is likely to formalize both the availability of the filing and the standards it must satisfy.

Do I need a lawyer to file a suggestion to reconsider?

Given the discretionary nature of the filing, the demanding Moreno standard, and the case-specific judgment required to identify what actually persuades the Court, experienced appellate counsel is strongly advisable. The suggestion is not a form filing, and the difference between a persuasive suggestion and one the Court will not act on is often the quality of the legal and evidentiary work behind it.

Does Ordiway PLLC handle suggestions to reconsider at the Court of Criminal Appeals?

Yes. Ordiway PLLC handles Texas post-conviction proceedings under Articles 11.07, 11.072, and 11.071, including suggestions to reconsider denied habeas applications under TRAP 79.2(d), as well as federal habeas under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and § 2254.

Texas Post-Conviction Representation

Ordiway PLLC is an appellate firm based in Dallas, Texas, representing clients in Texas state habeas proceedings across the state and in federal habeas nationwide. We handle direct appeals, habeas applications, and trial support. If you have questions about a Texas habeas denial or whether a suggestion to reconsider is appropriate in a particular case, please contact our office.

Disclaimer

This post is general Texas post-conviction commentary, not legal advice for any particular case. Reading this post does not create an attorney-client relationship with Ordiway PLLC.

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